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Abstract 
The present study adds to the literature on the impact of fiscal policy on business cycle 
synchronisation. Specifically, it investigates the effects of fiscal policy on business cycle 
synchronisation between the 10 EMU member-countries and the aggregate EMU12-wide 
business cycle, using a time-varying framework. The findings suggest that fiscal policy has 
important effects on business cycle synchronisation for all 10 EMU countries. Hence, fiscal 
policy is shown to have the potential to be supportive of macroeconomic stabilisation in the 
Eurozone. However the evidence reveals that none of the countries under examination 
consistently use fiscal policy to promote business cycle synchronisation. 
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1. Introduction 
 Since the launch of the Euro currency in 1999, European Monetary Union (EMU) has 
experienced a short but turbulent history. The knock on effects of the 2007 Economic and 
Financial Crisis has led to an “existential” crisis for the Eurozone. The root cause of the current 
difficulties for the Eurozone lies in the inherent contradiction between a single, supra-national 
currency and the maintenance of nation based fiscal policies and financial regulation (see, 
Lane, 2012 and Shambaugh, 2012 for a review).   
To ensure that supra-national (“one size fits all”) monetary policies are appropriate in 
individual national economies and thus ensuring that the union-wide monetary policy can 
effectively substitute national monetary policies, business cycles synchronisation is of 
paramount importance. If business cycles are not synchronised, national fiscal policies take on 
an additional importance as a tool for macroeconomic stabilisation policy. 
The importance of business cycle synchronisation for the operation of a common 
currency area has been highlighted in the seminal works on Optimum Currency Area theory 
(OCA) by Kennen (1969), McKinnon (1963), and Mundell (1961), as well as, in more recent 
contributions by Furceri and Karras (2008) and Alesina and Barro (2002). Indeed, business 
cycle synchronisation is regarded as a pre-requisite for the effective functioning of a monetary 
union (Alesina and Barro, 2002), and the very survival of a monetary union depends on the 
commonality of business cycle fluctuations (see Bergman, 2006)1.  
Business cycle synchronisation refers to the level of co-movement of the boom-bust 
economic phases of the member-countries over time2. It must be emphasised that business 
cycle synchronisation does not necessarily mean convergence in economic growth rates (see, 
Degiannakis et al., 2014). Convergence refers to the catch-up effect among countries’ growth 
rates, as opposed to synchronisation which refers to the co-movements of the countries’ growth 
rates (Crowley and Schultz, 2010).  
 To elaborate further, we argue that in a monetary union with synchronised business 
cycles among its member-countries, the common monetary policy can be effectively used as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Burns and Mitchell (1946, p.3) defines a business cycle as follows: 
“A cycle consists of expansions occurring at about the same time in many economic activities, followed by 
similarly general recessions, contractions, and revivals which merge into the expansion phase of the next cycle; 
this sequence of changes is recurrent but not periodic; in duration business cycles vary from more than one year 
to ten or twelve years; they are not divisible into shorter cycles of similar character with amplitudes approximating 
their own”.	  
2 A number of studies focus on the estimation of the level of business cycle synchronisation in EU and elsewhere. 
Among the plethora of studies, the interested reader is referred to Dufrénot and Keddad (2014), Degiannakis et 
al. (2014), Papageorgiou et al. (2010), Chen and Mills (2009), de Haan et al. (2008). 
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tool for macroeconomic stabilisation. However, when a country is impacted by an asymmetric 
shock (thus, its cycle becomes de-synchronised with the union-wide business cycle), or 
impacted asymmetrically by a common economic shock (once again this will lead to a de-
synchronisation of its business cycle with the union-wide cycle), independent fiscal policy can 
be used as a macroeconomic stabilisation tool. As such national fiscal policies in the Eurozone 
take on an additional role in promoting the cyclical synchronisation of Eurozone economies 
with the aggregate Euro-wide business cycle.  
Hence, understanding the effects of fiscal policy and the role it has played in 
determining business cycle synchronisation in the Eurozone is a pertinent and timely research 
question. As the architecture of EMU continues to evolve following the Global Financial Crisis 
of 2007-09 and the subsequent Eurozone debt crisis, it is of major importance to understand 
how fiscal policy impacts business cycle synchronisation. Thus, this paper examines the effects 
of fiscal policy on business cycle synchronisation between the 103 of the initial EMU12 
member-countries and the EMU12-wide business cycle, using a time-varying framework. 
Our evidence suggests that fiscal policy exercises a significant effect on business cycle 
synchronisation across all 10 EMU member-countries, although not to the same magnitude. In 
addition, this effect is both time-varying and country specific. Interestingly, we cannot claim 
that fiscal policy effects on business cycle synchronisation are different either in the pre or the 
post EMU period or between the core and peripheral EMU countries. Prominent among our 
results is that despite the fact that fiscal policy could increase business cycle synchronisation; 
there is no evidence that it has consistently been used in such a way.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature, Section 3 
describes the research question to be investigated, whereas, Sections 4 and 5 present the data 
and the Diag-BEKK model framework, respectively. Section 6 outlines the descriptive findings 
of the research and Section 7 analyses the time-varying effects of fiscal policy on business 
cycle synchronisation. Finally, Section 8 concludes the study along with a discussion of the 
policy implications. 
	  
2. Fiscal policy and business cycles 
 As aforementioned, the degree of business cycle synchronisation has an impact on the 
effectiveness of policies set by the central bank of a monetary union. In the case of synchronous 
cycles among the different economies that compose a monetary union, the central bank can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3The choice of 10 EMU countries was due to reasons of data availability as explained in the data section. 
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impose stabilisation policies with greater ease (see, for example, Clarida et al., 1999; Rogoff, 
1985). In the event that individual economies face asymmetric shocks, or react asymmetrically 
to symmetric shocks, fiscal authorities ought to use their fiscal policy to counterbalance the 
negative impacts of the common monetary policy (Crowley and Schultz, 2010). As Lane (2006, 
p.61) suggests for the EMU, ‘with a common monetary policy, national fiscal policies become 
the major tool by which governments can dampen fluctuations in output’. Fatas and Mihov 
(2009) also emphasise the fact that EMU member-countries should use their fiscal policy more 
actively in the monetary union in order to smooth their business cycles, since individual 
monetary policies are absent.  
Applying fiscal policy to dampen fluctuations in output in a monetary union will 
involve reacting to asymmetric shocks, as well as, reacting to symmetric shocks with 
asymmetric impacts.  The ability of any country’s economy to react to either shock, without 
fiscal policy intervention, will differ due to heterogeneous structural factors across countries, 
such as the degree of wage and price flexibility and the degree of labour mobility across 
countries. Such structural differences promote the need for and use of fiscal policy (Van Aarle 
and Garretsen, 2000). Along a similar vein, Bearce (2009) suggests that fiscal policy 
divergence within EMU may be necessary when macroeconomic convergence has not been 
achieved.  Hence, the expanded role for fiscal policy, as a result of EMU membership, will 
differ across countries depending on the individual economic structures of the national 
economy. 
An additional implication for the impact of fiscal policy on business cycle 
synchronisation is related to the objectives for which national fiscal policies are used. A 
political economy approach to fiscal policy emphasises that policy makers may not always use 
fiscal policy in a countercyclical fashion. Thus, the outcome of fiscal policy may be a deficit 
bias (Alesina and Tabellini, 1990; Persson and Svensson, 1989), a procyclical fiscal policy 
(Lane 2003) or even a business cycle driven by fiscal policy shocks (Fatas and Mihov, 2007; 
Drazen, 2000). Due to such potential outcomes, the institutions of EMU have constrained the 
use of fiscal policy through the Maastricht Treaty, The Stability and Growth Pact and more 
recently through the Fiscal Compact Treaty. 
Fatas and Mihov (2009) provide a useful review of the literature on the actual behaviour 
of fiscal policy in the EMU, reporting that fiscal policy is mildly procyclical. Furthermore, Gali 
and Perotti (2003) provide evidence that the fiscal constraints imposed in the Eurozone have 
been supportive of countercyclical fiscal policy. Fiscal policy is shown to change from being 
procyclical to countercyclical in the post Maastricht period. They opine that the Maastricht 
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Treaty encouraged discretionary fiscal policies to become more countercyclical over time in 
the Eurozone. This occurs because fiscal policy is constrained, thus, reducing policy induced 
fluctuations, allowing automatic stabilisers to take a more important role. However, Fatas and 
Mihov (2009) have not found any change in fiscal policy as a result of the Maastricht 
constraints or the adoption of the single currency, i.e. it remains mildly procyclical.  
However, Candelon et al. (2010) claim that there is an increase in the procyclical 
behaviour of fiscal policy during the post Maastricht period. They interpret this as evidence of 
the constraints tying the hands of fiscal policy makers. Thus, Bearce (2009) argues that greater 
flexibility is required under the Stability and Growth Pact in order for the EMU member-
countries to achieve greater macroeconomic synchronisation. Furceri (2009) and Fatas and 
Mihov (2003, 2006), on the other hand, suggest that unconstrained idiosyncratic fiscal policy 
is often a source of macroeconomic destabilisation and increased business cycle volatility, 
which in turn leads to the reduced synchronisation between business cycles. Thus, fiscal policy 
constraints could be useful in avoiding such destabilisation.  
No matter whether fiscal policy is applied in a countercyclical, procyclical or acyclical 
manner, its impact on business cycle synchronisation is an empirical question investigated by 
this study. The estimation of a time varying measure of business cycle synchronisation and the 
impact of fiscal policy on that level of synchronisation will provide evidence (i) on how fiscal 
policy impacts synchronisation and (ii) whether or not there has been a discernible change in 
the impact of fiscal policy overtime on this synchronisation. 
There are two main channels via which fiscal policy can impact business cycle 
synchronisation. Fiscal policy will impact on a country’s business cycle synchronisation with 
the aggregate EMU12-wide cycle directly through its impact on the domestic economy or 
indirectly through spillover effects.  
The impact of fiscal policy on the domestic economy has been a divisive issue among 
economists for some time, and the controversy has increased since the Global Financial Crisis 
of 2007-09.  Initially following the onset of the crisis there was widespread resort to fiscal 
stimulus, suggesting acceptance of a Keynesian approach to the negative demand shock (see, 
Krugman, 2012, for example). Critics of this approach argued that the fiscal stimulus was 
misguided and as debts and deficits grew it was more appropriate to restore balance to the 
public finances. Some claimed that restoring fiscal stability would engender an improvement 
in confidence, thus stimulating increased consumption, investment and growth. The theoretical 
and empirical support for these confidence effects of fiscal policy was provided in the seminal 
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work of Giavazzi and Pagano (1990)4. This research has influenced the “austerity” approach; 
whereby, under certain circumstances, a fiscal contraction may have an expansionary effect on 
the economy.  However, recently Alesina and Ardagna (2010, p.35) have remarked that we still 
know “… relatively little about the effect of fiscal policy…”. 
In attempting to reconcile these conflicting approaches, and to better understand the 
impacts of fiscal policy, an extensive body of recent research has focused on the size of fiscal 
multipliers.  Cogan et al. (2010) has question whether fiscal stimulus can be effective due to a 
small fiscal multiplier. Ilzetzki et al. (2013) find a negative multiplier in high debt countries, 
while other research distinguishes the size of fiscal multipliers during recessions and 
expansions, and reports fiscal multipliers to be much greater during recessions (Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko, 2012; Corsetti et al., 2012). Furthermore, using sub-national data Acconcia et 
al. (2014) have found multipliers as high as 1.9. These large fiscal multipliers suggest that 
fiscal policy could play an important role in determining business cycle synchronisation in 
EMU. 
In addition, an individual EMU country’s fiscal policy may also have spillover effects 
on other member countries and, thus, can affect business cycle synchronisation (Corsetti et al., 
2010)5. We maintain that EMU countries are interconnected not only through their currency 
but also through trade linkages. Thus, fiscal policy decisions in any one country are likely to 
have spillover effects into other countries, which are transmitted directly or indirectly via trade 
linkages. As such, a fiscal stimulus in one member-country could result in public spending 
falling directly on trading partners’ exports. Additionally, fiscal stimulus which expands 
economic activity in the home country may indirectly increase trading partners’ exports. In any 
case, exports of a member-country could increase due to a fiscal stimulus in another member-
country. The reverse of course holds true in the case of a fiscal contraction. Beetsma et al. 
(2006) and Giuliodori and Beetsma (2004) provide evidence of the importance of fiscal policy 
spillovers in Europe.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4Subsequent to Giavazzi and Pagano(1990) research focused on the theoretical considerations under which a fiscal 
contraction could be expansionary, these papers included, for example, Blanchard (1990), Drazen (1990), Bertola 
and Drazen (1993), Barry and Devereux (1995), Sutherland (1997), Perotti (1999) and Barry and Devereux 
(2003). Accompanying these theoretical papers several empirical papers tested whether a fiscal contraction could 
be expansionary in a variety of cross-country empirical studies, including inter alia Alesina and Perotti (1995), 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), McDermott and Westcott (1996), Alesina et al.(1998), Perotti (1999), Alesina et 
al.(2002), Perotti (2004), Perotti (2007), Alesina and Aardagna (2010), Romer and Romer (2010), IMF (2010) 
and Perotti (2011).  
5Cassette et al. (2013) also suggests that fiscal decisions are influenced by the interconnectedness among 
neighbouring countries, either due to geographic proximity or economic leadership. 
7	  
	  
Furthermore, any spillover effects from a large country’s fiscal policy would be 
expected to be greater due to the impact scale. For example, given that Germany’s GDP is 
almost 30% of EMU GDP, we could expect to observe greater potential spillover effects. Thus, 
it could be expected that the fiscal policies of larger countries could have sizeable effects on 
smaller countries’ business cycles. Considering though that this is the first study to examine 
the time-varying effects of fiscal policy on business cycle synchronisation, we do not separate 
these possible spillover effects of fiscal policy but rather we leave it for further study. In this 
study we solely focus on the overall effect of fiscal policy on business cycle synchronisation.  
 Overall, the focus on the effects of fiscal policy on business cycle synchronisation is 
still rather limited in the literature6. Studies such as Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2011), Inklaaret 
al. (2008), as well as, Böwer and Guillemineau (2006) and Darvas et al. (2005) indicate that 
greater fiscal policy convergence contributes to increased business cycle synchronisation. 
Nevertheless, none of the aforementioned studies have investigated the time-varying effects of 
fiscal policy on business cycle synchronisation, but rather, they use a static framework. 
Thus, the present study adds to the literature on the impact of fiscal policy on business 
cycle synchronisation in a time-varying environment. We do not consider fiscal policy 
convergence among the EMU member-countries, but rather we examine the effect of individual 
countries’ fiscal policy on the level of business cycle synchronisation between that country’s 
and the aggregate EMU12-wide business cycle. As such this approach directly examines how 
and if an individual country’s fiscal policy promotes business cycle synchronisation. 
Furthermore, previous studies do not allow for a time-varying impact of fiscal policy on 
business cycle synchronisation. This study is the first to utilise a time-varying framework to 
examine the effects of fiscal policy on business cycle synchronisation. The effects are 
examined in this framework to allow for variation over time associated with changing EU 
institutions and variations in national domestic fiscal priorities. 
This paper provides evidence of the impact of fiscal policy on business cycle 
synchronisation. The impact of fiscal policy on business cycle synchronisation is country-
specific and is not constant across time. Moreover, none of the countries examined consistently 
use fiscal policy to promote business cycle synchronisation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6The existing literature mainly concentrates its attention on other determinants of business cycle synchronisation, 
such as, trade intensity, financial integration, industrial specialisation, similarity in industrial structure, factor 
endowments, distance between countries, language, adjacency, political ideology and global economic shocks 
(see, Cerqueira and Martins, 2011; Kose et al., 2008; de Haan et al., 2008; Calderon et al., 2007; Kose and Yi, 
2006; Imbs, 2004, 2006; Morgan et al., 2004; Kose et al., 2003a, 2003b; Frankel and Rose, 1998; Canova and 
Dellas, 1993). 
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3. Dynamic Correlation between Business Cycles and Fiscal Policy 
An optimum currency area is enhanced when policy promotes synchronisation between 
national business cycles and the aggregate monetary union-wide cycle. If we denote the 
business cycle of country i , at time t , as tic , , and the union wide cycle as tMUc , , then the 
relationship between the two cycles is expressed as: 
tititMU cc ,,, φ= , (1) 
and each country’s target is 1, →tiφ , where ti ,φ denotes the level of synchronisation.  
We claim that each country’s business cycle fluctuations are related to certain economic 
variables, kti −,Ω , as well as, to the fiscal policy, ktix −, , such  that: 
( ), ,i t i t kc f −= Ω 7. (2) 
The kti −,Ω  and  ktix −,  are defined at time kt − for nk ,...,1,0= , to focus on the reaction of the 
business cycle to economic condition8. The business cycle’s fluctuations which are not related 
to fiscal policy are denoted as: 
( )nkxgcc ktititi ,...,1,0;,,*, =−= − , (3) 
where ( ).g  denotes a function (linear or non-linear) of fiscal policy at time kt − . Hence, the 
level of business cycle synchronisation between country i  and the monetary union, having 
disentangled country’s i  fiscal policy effect, can be defined as: 
*
,
*
,, tititMU cc φ= . (4) 
The quantity 
*
,, titi φφ −  (5) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 ( ).f represents a function - linear or non-linear – of kti −,Ω  , where ktiktix −− ⊂ ,, Ω .	  
8As we focus on the reaction of business cycle to fiscal policy changes and not on the effects of the business cycle 
on the deficit, a lagged relationship of ( )ktiti xfc −= ,,  could be considered; i.e. previous year’s fiscal policy changes 
could matter to current year’s synchronisation. However, this approach would underestimate the impact of the 
fiscal policy in very flexible economies where the economic reactions to fiscal shocks are short lived; ( )titi xfc ,, =
. According to Mertens and Ravn (2012) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002) for the US case, and Giuliodori and 
Beetsma (2009) for Europe, fiscal policy has non-negligible effects in the very short term, and they can die out 
very fast. Additionally, the political environment in any specific member state likely will determine the 
distribution of the fiscal stimulus impact to aggregate demand over a longer than one year horizon. More open 
governments will tend to front load most of the impact to the first year, or even before that if households have 
rational expectations, whereas governments that tend to have surprising changes in fiscal policy, perhaps because 
of a more opaque political process or because of changing coalition partner demands, will likely have a greater 
weight on the second year impact. In order to incorporate such aspects in the analysis, we assume a multiple-years 
relationship between fiscal policy and business cycles, i.e. ( )ktiti xfc −= ,, , for nk ...,2,1,0= .	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explains the impact of fiscal policy on the synchronisation level between the union-wide and 
country i ’s business cycles. The research question this paper examines is whether:  
Country i ’s fiscal policy does affect the level of business cycle synchronisation with 
the monetary union-wide cycle, or 0*,, ≠− titi φφ . 
Arguably, the relationship between country i  and the union wide cycle varies across 
time and, thus, the effects of fiscal policy on business cycle synchronisation is also expected to 
be time varying. Hence, this framework captures the dynamic behaviour of fiscal authorities. 
	  
4. Data Description 
 The dataset includes annual9 GDP and Cyclically Adjusted Net Lending (NLB)10 data 
from 1011 EMU member-countries and the aggregate EMU12 (EMU12 core members: Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands; EMU12 periphery members: Greece, 
Ireland, Italy and Portugal). The data cover the period from 1980 to 201212. All GDP prices are 
expressed in logarithms; they are seasonally adjusted and refer to constant levels. The 
Cyclically Adjusted Net Lending data have been converted into percentages of GDP. The data 
are retrieved from the Annual Macro-Economic database, AMECO®, of the European 
Commission and Datastream®.  
 The EMU12 member-countries’ GDP data are used to extract a European wide business 
cycle. This is the average cycle at which the common monetary policy is assumed to be 
responsive to. Although since its inception EMU has increased to 17 member countries we 
retain our focus on the original members. Cyclically adjusted net lending data is used to assess 
the effects of discretionary fiscal policy, in each of the sample countries, on their individual 
economies business cycle synchronisation with the aggregate EMU12 cycle. 
 The cyclical components of the log-GDP series are extracted using the Hodrick and 
Prescott (1997) filter, which was originally proposed by Leser (1961). Additional filtering 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The use of annual data is mainly influenced by the use of fiscal variables. Fiscal data on annual basis are 
calculated on an accrual based approach, whereas in quarterly frequency the fiscal estimates are calculated on 
cash based approach (thus, not appropriately measured). Furthermore, quarterly net lending data was not available 
for the full sample period for all countries. In addition, the estimated output (not shown here but available upon 
request) provided evidence that the quarterly data are not useful for policy implication, because of the cash-based 
nature of variables.  	  
10 The net lending/borrowing is largely determined by the business cycle and therefore highly endogenous. Thus, 
the use of the cyclically adjusted net lending addresses the issue of endogeneity in our model.	  
11 The EMU12 business cycle is estimated in the same spirit with Artis et al. (2004). Spain and Luxembourg have 
been omitted from the analysis due to the lack of availability of cyclically adjusted net lending for the full period. 
Nevertheless, we incorporated the Spanish GDP for the calculation of the EMU12 business cycle.	  
12 For Greece the data cover the period 1988 to 2012, whereas for Ireland the data cover the period 1985 to 2012. 	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methods have also been used (Baxter and King, 1999 filter and Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2003 
band pass filter) for robustness purposes and in order to allow to the results to be comparable 
with the existing literature. The results are qualitatively similar. 
 To estimate the cyclical component, using the Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filter, we 
assume that the seasonally adjusted log-GDP series, y , is composed of a trend, τ ,	  and a 
cyclical component, c , such that: 
ttt cy +=τ . (6) 
 The cyclical component can be found by deducting the trend component from the actual 
series, assuming that irregular movements of the GDP series are zero. Thus, it is maintained 
that the cyclical variations represent deviations from the estimated long run trend of the series. 
In order to filter the trend component so that we then deduct it from the actual series, we need 
an appropriate smoothing parameter λ , that minimizes: 
( ) ( )[ ]∑ ∑
=
−
=
−+ −−−+
T
t
T
t
tttttc
1
1
2
2
11
2 ττττλ .
 
(7) 
The first part of Eq. 7 penalizes for poor fit (i.e. large residuals), whereas the second term 
penalizes variability in the trend component’s growth rate. The choice of the smoothing 
parameter λ  influences the output of the cyclical component. The larger the value ofλ , the 
greater the penalty and, thus, the smoother the estimated trend will be.  On the other hand a 
low value of λ  will produce a more volatile estimated trend13.  
	  
5. Estimating the Effects of Fiscal Policy on the Dynamic Correlation  
 This section describes the method used to estimate the effects of fiscal policy on 
business cycle synchronisation over time. Once we isolate the cyclical component of the GDP 
series, we adopt the following procedure, which is comprised of three steps: 
Step 1: Define an estimate of the correlation between the business cycles of the 10 EU countries 
and the aggregate EMU12 cycle. 
 The research question stated in Section 2 requires the estimation of time varying ti,φ  
and *,tiφ  quantities. An appropriate measure of the quantities ti,φ  and 
*
,tiφ  is the correlation 
coefficient. If a time-invariant relationship between country i  and the union wide cycle had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13Hodrick and Prescott (1997) suggest that for monthly, quarterly and annual data the appropriate smoothing 
parameter should take the value 14400, 1600 and 100, respectively.
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been considered, then the level of synchronisation would have been iφ . In such a case, the 
impact of fiscal policy on the synchronisation level between the union-wide and the country i  
business cycles would be *ii φφ − . The iφ  and 
*
iφ could be estimated from titiitMU cc ,,, εφ +=  
and  
( ) tiktiitiitMU xcc ,,1,,*, εβφ +−= − , (8) 
respectively.  
Considering the dynamic behaviour of business cycles and fiscal policies, such time-
invariant estimates could not provide policy information. Requiring the correlation coefficients 
to vary over time, we propose the estimation of ti,φ  and 
*
,tiφ  as the time-varying correlation 
coefficients obtained by a multivariate dynamic auto-correlated and cross-correlated 
framework illustrated as (introduced by Bollerslev et al., 1988): 
( )
( ),,...,,...,,
,,;~
2121
2/1
−−−−=
=
ttttt
tt
ttt
vF
εεHHH
I0zz
zHc
σ  
(9) 
where the vector ⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
=
t
ti
t c
c
,12
,c  refers to the bivariate stochastic process under investigation; i.e. 
the business cycles at an annual frequency14. The tic , , for 11,...,1=i , denotes the business cycles 
of the 10 countries, whereas the tc ,12  denotes the business cycle of the aggregate EMU12. tz is 
a vector process with zero mean, ( ) 0z =tE , unit variance and zero covariance, ( ) Izz =ʹ′ttE . Its 
density function, ( )I0z ,,;vF t  is defined by a vector of parameters v . Additionally, ( ).σ is a 
positive measurable function of the lagged conditional covariance matrices and the vector of 
business cycles. The stationary property of the business cycle, as this has been extracted by the 
HP filter, justifies the estimation of the aforementioned framework.  
Framework (9) presents a generalized specification of multivariate ARCH model15. A 
similar approach has been adopted by Degiannakis et al. (2014) to investigate the correlation 
between the EU12 business cycle and the EU12 member-countries. The ith diagonal element of 
tH  expresses the dynamic variance of tic , , or 2,tiσ , whereas, the i, jth non-diagonal element of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The business cycles are stationary according to the ADF, PP and KPSS unit root tests. The results are available 
upon request. 
15 Technical details for the multivariate time-varying correlation models are available in Xekalaki and Degiannakis 
(2010, p.446). 
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tH  expresses the dynamic covariance between tic ,  and  tjc , , or tji ,,σ . Hence, the time varying 
approximation of ti,φ  is, then, estimated as: 
2
,12
2
,
,12,
,12,,
ˆ
tti
ti
titi
σσ
σ
ρφ =≡ . (10) 
In order to estimate framework (9), we utilize the Diag-BEKK16 structure for the 
variance-covariance matrix tH , introduced by Engle and Kroner (1995), and the standard 
normal density function for the vector process tz . The appropriateness of the Diag-BEKK 
specification for modelling the conditional covariance matrix has been tested for residuals’ 
serial correlation with Lütkepohl’s (2007) multivariate Q-statistic and for the presence of 
ARCH effects in the residuals with Tse’s (2002) test. The conditional covariance matrix has 
been investigated in the general form: ,~~~~
11
∑∑
=
−
=
−− ʹ′+ʹ′ʹ′+=
p
i
iiti
q
i
iititit BHBAεεAAH 0 . The lag orders 
qp,  have been investigated according to Schwarz's (1978) Bayesian information criterion. An 
asymmetric form of the Diag-BEKK model has been estimated but the asymmetric coefficients 
are statistically insignificant. Thus, the standard likelihood ratio test and the model selection 
information criteria proposed the symmetric form of the Diag-BEKK model. The Diag-BEKK 
with standard normal distribution is defined as: 
( )
,~~~~
,;~
1111111
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(11) 
where ( )ʹ′−≡ 0,120, ββitt cε  is the de-meaned tc , with a conditional covariance matrix 
denoted as tH . The Diag-BEKK specification defines a positive definite tH  matrix. The 
( )I0zz ,;~ tt N  is the bivariate standard normal density function. The 0,iβ  and 0,12β  coefficients 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16The aim of this paper is to inform policy decision makers on the effects of fiscal policy on business cycle 
synchronisation. The use of annual data, which are flatter compared to those sampled on quarterly frequency, 
demand for models that can capture the full dynamics of the volatility and covariance estimates, such as the BEKK 
model. In order to estimate bivariate covariance matrices, the Diag-BEKK specification is preferable compared 
to models whose success depends on their ability to estimate large time varying covariance matrices such as 
Engle's (2002) Dynamic Conditional Correlation model. Moreover, it involves the estimation of less number of 
parameters than other multivariate GARCH models like Engle's et al. (1986) VECH model, Baba's et al. (1990) 
BEKK model, etc. If quarterly data could have been used then these data would require models that provide 
smoother volatility and covariance estimates, such as the RiskMetrics which is more parsimonious (see 
Degiannakis et al., 2014). 
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denote the average value of the business cycle of the ith country and the business cycle of the 
aggregate EMU12, respectively.  
 The covariance matrix of the Diag-BEKK model is defined as: 
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 The time-varying correlation of the thi  country's business cycle and the aggregate 
EMU12 business cycle, ti ,12,ρ , which corresponds to the synchronisation quantity ti,φ ,is 
estimated as: 
( )( )2 1,1222,22 1,1222,22,22 1,21,12 1,21,11,1
2,21,12,1,12,21,121,1,12,1
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 The proposed structure of 1
~,AA0 and 1
~B , produces time-varying covariances 
(numerator of equation above). Otherwise (in case of constant covariance), a time-varying 
correlation due to the time-varying standard deviations would lead to an increase/decrease in 
synchronisation in less/more volatile periods. 
 
Step 2: Define an estimate of the correlation between the business cycles of the 10 EU countries 
and the aggregate EMU12 cycle, which is not explained by the fiscal deficit. 
 The Diag-BEKK model specification is reformed in order to capture the effect of the 
current and/or previous years’ fiscal deficit to the current year's business cycle. Let the variable 
tix ,  refer to the fiscal deficit of the ith country. Then, the term ktiiititi xc −−−= ,1,0,,, ββε  
expresses the business cycle of the ith country, at year t, that is not explained by the current 
and/or previous years’ fiscal deficit. The lags nk ,...,1,0=  incorporated into the model are 
selected according to the Schwarz (1978) Bayesian criterion. We model the contemporaneous, 
0=k , and the lagged effects, , of fiscal policy to business cycle as i) the fiscal policy has 
non-negligible effects in the very short term, ii) open governments tend to front load most of 
the impact of fiscal changes to the first year, iii) governments that tend to have surprising 
changes in fiscal policy have a greater weight on the second year impact.   
1≥k
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 The intention is to capture the time-varying correlation between the business cycles of 
10 EU countries and the aggregate EMU12 business cycle which does not emanate from the 
fiscal deficit. The Diag-BEKK model framework is reformed as: 
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 The time-varying correlation of the thi  country's business cycle and the aggregate 
EMU12 cycle which is not explained by the previous year's fiscal deficit, ∗ ti ,12,ρ , which 
corresponds to the synchronisation quantity *,tiφ , is estimated as 
2
,12
2
,
,12,
,12,
tti
ti
ti
σσ
σ
ρ =∗  (15) 
from framework (14). 
 
Step 3: Estimate the impact of fiscal policy on the synchronisation of the business cycles.   
 The difference between the time-varying correlations ti ,12,ρ  and 
∗
ti ,12,ρ  explains the 
impact of lagged fiscal policy on the synchronisation of the thi country’s business cycle with 
the aggregate EMU12 business cycle. A positive difference indicates that country i’s lagged 
fiscal policy promotes greater synchronisation with the aggregate EMU12 business cycle, 
whereas the reverse applies for a negative difference. A zero difference implies that fiscal 
policy has not impacted on business cycle synchronisation. 
	  
6. Some business cycles and fiscal policy descriptive statistics 
Figure 1 presents the cyclical component of the business cycle for each EMU member-
country as well as for the EMU12 and Table 1 exhibits their descriptive statistics. The business 
cycle is presented as a percentage of each country’s GDP to enable comparisons across 
different sized economies. 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
The business cycles are presented in terms of country groups for ease of exposition. All 
business cycles follow a similar pattern, nevertheless the EMU periphery countries seem to 
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exhibit a more amplified variation. This is also evident by the standard deviation of these 
countries’ business cycles, as shown in Table 1. That is indicative of a core-periphery divide 
in business cycles, as established by Agresti and Mojon (2001), and Wynne and Koo (2000). 
Although, Italy is not considered a core country, its business cycle is similar to those of the 
core EMU countries. Similarly, Finland’s business cycle also exhibits higher amplitude, which 
resembles the behaviour of the periphery’s business cycles. From Table 1 we also observe that 
cycles have a mean of almost zero, as expected. 
 Concerning the fiscal deficit, the descriptive statistics shown in Table 2 demonstrate 
that Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Belgium experience significantly higher deficits compared to 
the average EMU12 and those of the core EMU countries, such as Austria, Germany and 
Netherlands. It is interesting to note that Finland has on average a fiscal surplus. Furthermore, 
the high standard deviations of Belgium, Greece, Ireland and Italy imply a more active fiscal 
policy in these countries.  
In addition, Figure 2 informs us that fiscal policy has not been very responsive to 
business cycle fluctuations (as a countercyclical fiscal policy might suggest it ought to be), as 
the constantly negative values imply a fiscal deficit bias. The pattern of fiscal deficit is also 
observed in the core EMU countries. Overall, during the period under examination, fiscal 
policy has been in deficit as shown in the aggregate EMU12 data, which is in line with the 
well-known deficit bias in fiscal policy of Tabellini and Alesina (1990) and Persson and 
Svensson (1989).  
 [FIGURE 2 HERE] 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
The observed deficit is gradually reduced during the run-up to EMU which is indicative 
of the adjustments these countries made to fiscal policy prior to EMU membership.  
Turning our attention to the time-varying synchronisation, we can observe the 
following empirical regularities (see Figure 3). First, the synchronisation level is fairly high, 
on average, during most of the period of this study for all member countries. Second, Ireland 
and Germany are the only two countries that exhibit any negative correlation with the EMU-
wide cycle. Third, since the inception of the common currency, we observe that there is an 
increase in the synchronisation level, although this is more apparent for the core EMU 
countries. Forth, since the onset of the European Debt crisis in 2010 we observe a divergence 
in the level of synchronisation among the member-countries and the EMU-wide cycle. More 
importantly, de-synchronisation is observed between the German business cycle and that of the 
EMU-wide cycle.           
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[FIGURE 3 HERE] 
Having examined the countries’ business cycles, fiscal policy stances and their 
synchronisation level with the aggregate EMU-wide cycle, we further analyse the impact of 
fiscal policy on business cycle synchronisation. 
 
7. The Time-varying Effects of Fiscal Policy on Business Cycle Synchronisation 
Indicatively, Tables 3 and 4 present the estimated parameters of the Diag-BEKK(1,1) 
model for France and Italy, respectively17. Table 5 and Figure 4 present the effect of fiscal 
policy on business cycle synchronisation for the 10 EMU sample countries, as expressed from 
the difference between the estimates ti ,12,ρ  and 
∗
ti ,12,ρ . The difference 
( )∗− titi ,12,,12, ρρ  (16) 
quantifies the impact of fiscal policy on the synchronisation of the thi country’s cycle with the 
aggregate EMU12-wide cycle. The analysis of the impact of fiscal policy on determining 
business cycle synchronisation reveals some interesting results.  
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
From Table 5, we observe that fiscal policy over the whole sample period has on 
average a positive effect on the level of synchronisation in many countries, although this does 
not hold true for France, Germany, Netherlands and Portugal.  
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
This is a positive finding for the Eurozone, showing that on average fiscal policy 
operates to support the synchronisation of business cycles. In nearly all cases the average figure 
is below 10%, although in four cases the impact is negative. This could be suggestive of the 
fact that fiscal policy may not be a very important determinant of business cycle 
synchronisation for most countries. However, there are two points that need to be raised. First, 
the standard deviations reveal that for most countries the effect of fiscal policy is not stable 
over the sample period but it is rather volatile. Second, the values on Table 5 do not allow for 
the time-varying impact of fiscal policy on business cycle synchronisation. Thus, the full 
picture of the effects of fiscal policy can be revealed by a time-varying approach, as illustrated 
in Figure 4.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17For the sake of brevity, Diag-BEKK estimates for the remaining countries are not shown here but they are 
available upon request. The variance covariance matrix has been estimated using the robust quasi-maximum 
likelihood method of Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992).	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[FIGURE 4 HERE] 
Contrary to the static character of the average effects of fiscal policy on business cycle 
synchronisation which were reported in Table 5, the panels in Figure 4 actually suggest that 
fiscal policy does have an economically important effect on business cycle synchronisation for 
nearly all countries. Even more so, for some countries, such as Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Ireland and Portugal, fiscal policy has a substantial effect, changing the synchronisation 
measure by more than 65%. On the contrary, the impact in Austria and Belgium is much less 
sizable.   
Nonetheless, the importance of fiscal policy on determining synchronisation is not the 
full story emerging from the results. The findings indicate that the impact of fiscal policy is 
country specific, as well as, time-varying. This is consistent with the findings of Candelon et 
al. (2010), regarding the country specific impacts of fiscal policy. With respect to the variation 
of the impact of fiscal policy over time, the switch in the sign of ∗− titi ,12,,12, ρρ  shows the change 
from positive to negative influences across time. There are periods that fiscal policy promotes 
business cycle synchronisation (the line fluctuates in the positive region), whereas at other 
times, fiscal policy has the opposite effect. These abrupt and irregular changes across time 
enhance the motivation for the estimation of the time-varying measure of the effects of fiscal 
policy on business cycle synchronisation.  
We continue our analysis focusing on the effects of fiscal policy on business cycle 
synchronisation during both recessionary and non-recessionary periods. Heterogeneous 
behaviour is observed across the different countries and time periods. However, no discernible 
difference is apparent in the impact of fiscal policy on business cycle synchronisation during 
recessionary and non-recessionary periods.  For example, during the ongoing European Debt 
crisis (a common shock with asymmetric responses), fiscal policy had a positive impact on 
synchronisation in many countries, such as Finland, Ireland or Italy. More precisely, the 
difference between ti ,12,ρ  and  fluctuated around the 20% level, although it reached the 
level of 80% in the case of Finland. On the other hand, in the cases of Greece, Germany and 
the Netherlands, fiscal policy had a detrimental effect on business cycle synchronisation. This 
is especially evident in the case of Greece, where the difference between ti ,12,ρ  and
∗
ti ,12,ρ was 
more than 40%. Yet, for Austria or Belgium fiscal policy did not really have any effect on 
synchronisation. Similar heterogeneous observations can be also made for other European 
recessionary periods. 
∗
ti ,12,ρ
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The lack of using fiscal policy to consistently promote business cycle synchronisation 
may be possible due to the fact that the domestic fiscal policy stance is not explicitly targeting 
business cycle synchronisation. In addition, domestic fiscal policy may be influenced by 
politically motivated choices, which may not necessarily lead to greater synchronisation. 
Nevertheless, while policy makers may not be expected to use fiscal policy to promote business 
cycle synchronisation, the goal of macroeconomic stabilisation in a monetary union suggests 
that it ought to play such a role in response to asymmetric shocks.  
However, the present study does not provide evidence of fiscal policy behaviour which 
consistently supports business cycle synchronisation. The empirical effects of fiscal policy 
identified here suggest that fiscal policy could play such a role. As such fiscal policy could be 
useful in mitigating the costs of EMU membership when structural differences or asymmetries 
between economies are more prevalent. Additionally, we cannot observe any discernible 
difference in the role of fiscal policy in determining business cycle synchronisation, either in 
the pre or post EMU period or between the core and peripheral EMU countries. Overall, we 
find evidence that none of the countries under examination consistently use fiscal policy to 
promote business cycle synchronisation, as macroeconomic theory suggests it ought to in a 
monetary union. 
	  
8. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
A successful currency union is facilitated when its member-states have synchronised 
business cycles. A number of determinants of business cycle synchronisation have been 
identified by the literature (see, among others, Boschi and Girardi, 2011; Cerqueira and 
Martins, 2011; Kose et al., 2008; Imbs, 2004, 2006; Morgan et al., 2004; Kose et al., 2003a, 
2003b; Frankel and Rose, 1998; Canova and Dellas, 1993), nevertheless, the existing empirical 
work provides scarce evidence regarding the impact of fiscal policy on business cycle 
synchronisation. Thus, this paper investigates the effects of individual countries’ fiscal policy 
on the time-varying business cycle synchronisation between 10 of the initial EMU12 member-
countries and the aggregate EMU12 business cycle. The study uses annual GDP and cyclically 
adjusted Net Lending data from 10 EMU member-countries and the aggregate EMU12. The 
sample period runs from 1980 to 2012.   
We maintain that understanding the potential effects of fiscal policy in determining 
business cycle synchronisation in the EMU is an important and timely question. This is justified 
by the fact that since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-09 and the ongoing Eurozone debt 
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crisis, the economic debate revolves around fiscal consolidation and its impact on economic 
activity, and thus on business cycles.  
The evidence of the paper suggests that fiscal policy is an important determinant of 
business cycle synchronisation across all 10 EMU member-countries. For a number of 
countries, such as Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland and Portugal, the magnitude of the 
fiscal policy effects is greater, whereas the impact in other countries (e.g. in Austria and 
Belgium) it is considerably smaller.  Furthermore, we maintain that fiscal policy effects vary 
both across time and across countries. However, we cannot provide evidence that the 
importance of fiscal policy in determining business cycle synchronisation differs either in the 
pre or post EMU period or between the core and peripheral EMU countries.  
Finally, we must emphasise that according to our findings, fiscal policy could influence 
business cycle synchronisation in a way that is conducive to the operation of the single currency 
area. However, we cannot infer that fiscal policy has consistently been used in such a way 
throughout the sample period. Even more, the empirical results show that the use of fiscal 
policy could lead to de-synchronisation of the business cycles. Nevertheless, the institutional 
response in the Eurozone, as exemplified most recently by the Fiscal Compact, focuses on 
curtailing the build-up of debt and limiting the fiscal deficit (in order to promote convergence 
and sustainability in public finances), despite the fact that the restrictions they impose could 
limit the stabilising role that fiscal policy could potentially play in EMU. 
The policy implication of the aforementioned results is that fiscal stance is a useful 
stabilisation tool in a monetary union. The findings also suggest that the design of fiscal 
constraints should allow for fiscal policy to perform this role when necessary, while 
constraining idiosyncratic policy induced de-synchronisation. In the presence of such 
constraints, a union-wide borrowing facility would be useful to stabilise asymmetric shocks 
when domestic fiscal constraints are reached, as in the current EMU debt crisis. Alternatively, 
other systems of fiscal transfer across EMU would be necessary to ensure stability. The 
aforementioned policy implications are complementary to Colciago et al. (2008) who suggest 
that fiscal constraints should focus on the control of aggregate EMU debt and the pursuit of 
policies that are symmetrical over the cycle. 
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Figure 1. Business cycles ( tic , ) of the EMU member-countries and the aggregate EMU12. 
 
-­20
-­15
-­10
-­5
0
5
10
15
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
EMU12
-­20
-­15
-­10
-­5
0
5
10
15
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
AUSTRIA BELGIUM FINLAND
FRANCE GERMANY NETHERLANDS
-­20
-­15
-­10
-­5
0
5
10
15
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
GREECE IRELAND
ITALY PORTUGAL 	  
 
	  
26	  
	  
	  
Figure 2. Cyclically Adjusted Fiscal Deficits as a percentage of GDP; titi GDPx ,,  of the EMU member-
countries.	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Figure 3. Time varying business cycle synchronisation between the EMU member-countries and the 
EMU12-wide business cycle (the line graphs plot the time-varying correlations ti ,12,ρ ).	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Figure 4. The impact of the cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit on the time varying business cycle 
synchronisation between the EMU member-countries and the EMU12-wide business cycle (the line graphs 
plot the percentage difference between the time-varying correlations ti ,12,ρ  and
∗
ti ,12,ρ  across time). The grey 
area surrounding the line plots the 95% confidence interval.	  
	  
	  
	  
Note: The vertical grey shaded areas denote European recessions according to the CEPR Euro Area Business Cycle Dating 
Committee. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the business cycles for the EMU 
member-countries and the aggregate EMU12. 
Country Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Austria 0.0001 3.6048 -2.7247 1.6201 
Belgium 0.0002 3.1863 -2.1024 1.4502 
Finland 0.0008 11.4895 -8.5633 4.7336 
France 0.0001 3.7423 -7.7335 2.5317 
Germany 0.0003 6.5334 -6.9896 3.2089 
Greece 0.0003 8.8943 -15.0973 4.5252 
Ireland 0.0006 13.2649 -11.3363 6.4189 
Italy 0.0004 3.8634 -9.3371 2.6915 
Netherlands 0.0007 4.7608 -4.2564 2.0534 
Portugal 0.0002 7.3054 -6.6771 3.4074 
EMU12 0.0001 4.1723 -2.6531 1.8640 
	  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of cyclically adjusted fiscal deficits 
(percentage of GDP) for the EMUmember-countries. 
Country Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Austria -2.8219 -0.2971 -5.4630 1.1613 
Belgium -5.2260 0.5722 -15.6908 4.3146 
Finland 1.3316 5.8184 -3.6389 2.5922 
France -3.4010 -0.6332 -6.3373 1.4267 
Germany -2.3747 0.4499 -9.6104 1.9095 
Greece -8.6851 -2.3438 -19.0856 4.1637 
Ireland -3.8353 3.0329 -28.2719 6.5072 
Italy -6.8531 -1.1804 -12.3374 3.7717 
Netherlands -3.0719 0.5956 -8.3844 2.0655 
Portugal -5.5969 -3.1612 -10.4832 1.9889 
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Table 3. Estimated parameters of the Diag-BEKK(1,1) model for France. The coefficient 
to standard error ratios are reported in brackets. 
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Table 4. Estimated parameters of the Diag-BEKK(1,1) model for Italy. The coefficient to 
standard error ratios are reported in brackets. 
Without the Fiscal Policy Variable 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics of ( )∗− titi ,12,,12, ρρ ; the percentage impact of 
the cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit on the time varying business cycle 
synchronisation. 
Country Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Austria 0.5426 25.2452 -21.1027 9.8239 
Belgium 1.4036 21.1531 -3.8198 5.7992 
Finland 9.9194 68.1599 -68.7512 30.4105 
France -3.5220 30.0601 -36.5187 14.6396 
Germany -2.3565 87.1816 -55.4394 24.5987 
Greece 9.9220 151.1152 -46.6216 40.4158 
Ireland 0.6481 65.2331 -39.6497 22.3510 
Italy 11.1891 95.3999 -37.1065 28.1504 
Netherlands -0.8652 33.9655 -42.1086 16.4292 
Portugal -8.8455 28.7667 -77.2819 22.6602 
 
